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Abstract
Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result
in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefﬁciency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter
estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies.
Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.
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Self-determination is intuitively appealing. However, theoretical results such as
Alesina and Spolaore [1997] show that political boundaries resulting from local democratic decisions may be ineﬃcient. At the international level, there is substantial
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boundaries.1 Currently, there is limited empirical evidence regarding the eﬃciency
of boundaries resulting from local decision-making. This paper analyzes a recent set
of municipal mergers in Japan that relied on local approval of amalgamations, and
shows that the ﬁnal number of jurisdictions was more than twice as large as it would
have been under centralized decision-making.
In the Heisei Daigappei, individual Japanese municipalities could choose what
merger if any they wished to participate in, given a set of national government transfer
policies. Due to claimed diﬀerences in eﬃciencies of scale, prior to the mergers smaller
municipalities spent over ¥1,000,000 per capita per year providing services that larger
municipalities provided for slightly over ¥100,000, with this diﬀerence being covered
by transfers from the national government.2 These transfers distorted local incentives:
municipalities preferred to remain independent and receive large transfers in situations
where the national government would rather have had them merge. Fiscal tightening
at the end of the 1990s led to the national government announcing a special mergerpromotion transfer policy. The nature of this policy led to a large number of mergers
occurring within the 1999-2010 period, as shown in Figure 1. Observed mergers can
thus plausibly be treated as the outcome of a single period coalition formation game,
making analysis via a structural model feasible.
The theoretical model in this paper involves municipalities that provide a geographicallylocated public good, and a national government that makes equalizing transfers to
those localities that have particularly high costs or low tax bases. Policy choices
maximize sums of individual utilities, and for any given ﬁxed set of borders there is
no conﬂict between the objectives of the local governments and that of the national
government. The design of proper local borders for the federal system in this model,
however, is itself subject to a classic tradeoﬀ of federalism: the national government
lacks information about which potential arrangements of boundaries are idiosyncratically good or bad, while local governments do not take into account all the structural
1

Despite two thirds support for independence in a referendum (99% yes with about a third
of the population boycotting), the Republic of South Ossetia is currently recognized by only four
countries. After a referendum with even higher support and a 17 year delay, the Republic of Kosovo
is recognized by about half of UN members. At the subnational level, there is variation in the
treatment of municipal boundary changes even between very similar countries. For example, in
Finland and Norway municipal mergers were voluntary, in Sweden they were forced, and in Denmark
there appears to have been a hybrid system.
2
For comparisons, ¥1=1¢ is a rough but useful approximation. During the period in which
ﬁnancial data is analyzed, the USD/JPY exchange rate has varied from ¥147=$1 (Aug. ’98) to
¥80=$1 (Oct. ’10). GDP per capita has remained relatively constant at ¥4,000,000.
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costs and beneﬁts of potential conﬁgurations. The possibility of municipal mergers
thus leads to the potential for ineﬃciency, as mergers that are optimal from the local
perspective may not be from the national perspective.
The merger process is modelled as a Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] hedonic
coalition formation game, where due to a commitment problem municipalities cannot
oﬀer payments or otherwise bargain with each other in exchange for agreeing to a
merger.3 The solution to this game is expressed as an abstract stable set. Parameters are estimated based on a revealed preference approach, using data on actually
observed mergers. Two problems that must be overcome are the very large number
of potential arrangements of municipalities into mergers, and the fact that coalition
formation games of the type being examined do not in general have a unique equilibrium.
These problems are dealt with by using an estimator based on moment inequalities, following Pakes [2010]. Necessary conditions for the observed mergers to be
stable can be checked without enumerating all other potential mergers, and these
conditions must hold regardless of whether the observed outcome is only one of many
stable partitions. Most of the moment inequalities used in estimation are of the type
employed in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii [2011], but
one moment inequality based on the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks has not previously appeared in the literature. A speciﬁc choice of covariance structure, based on
interpreting the idiosyncratic term as unobserved cultural heterogeneity, reduces the
dimension of the error term and makes estimation feasible. A resulting weakness of
the model is that the covariance structure of the error term cannot itself be estimated,
as the model is only tractable for the speciﬁc structure assumed.
Parameter estimates show a tradeoﬀ between geographic proximity and eﬃciencies of scale in the provision of local public services. The estimated eﬃciencies of
scale, however, are not as extreme as the estimates used by the national government
in its calculation of transfer payments. If this paper’s estimates of eﬃciencies of scale
are correct, then the transfer formula actually used by the national government is inconsistent with it weighting all individuals equally; however, this transfer formula is
consistent with the national government maximizing an objective function where indi3

Acemoglu [2003] argues that the case where transfers are not possible is more relevant for issues
in political economy. The approach in this paper is thus necessarily diﬀerent from that of Fox [2008]
and other recent papers analyzing coalition formation games relevant to industrial organization.
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vidual weights are proportional to a simple measure of legislative malapportionment
at the national level.
Using this additional result regarding the national government’s objective function, numeric estimates for ineﬃciency from the perspective of the national government can be calculated. First, in order to provide an incentive for municipalities
to engage in decentralized mergers, the national government had to oﬀer a special
transfer policy diﬀerent from its ﬁrst-best policy for ﬁxed boundaries: the ineﬃciency
here is equivalent to ¥250 billion in national government spending. The mergers that
resulted from this incentive scheme, however, are equivalent to an additional ¥335
billion in national government spending even with the second-best transfers. It is
also possible to compare the actually observed mergers with the mergers the national
government would have mandated if it had chosen a merger pattern directly: centralized mergers would have reduced the number of municipalities to about 650, rather
than the 1750 obtained under the decentralized mergers. The improvement over the
decentralized pattern would be equivalent to about ¥815 billion of national spending
if only the structural component of payoﬀs is considered.
This ﬁnal result, however, does not imply that the Japanese government erred
in deciding to decentralize the Heisei municipal mergers. The merger process is decentralized in order to take advantage of information that is available to neither the
national government nor an outside analyst. The resulting mergers will thus have
better idiosyncratic characteristics than centrally-planned mergers. If the Japanese
government had the option of centralized mergers, but chose a decentralized process
instead, then the interpretation of the above results should be that this information problem is economically signiﬁcant. That is, both centralized and decentralized
mergers are substantially worse than the ﬁrst-best merger pattern that the central
government would implement if it had all available information.
The closest related work is Gordon and Knight [2009], who examine school district
mergers in Iowa.4 In their model, districts merge in pairs, and match quality is
symmetric. This results in a unique stable matching, and parameters are estimated
via simulated method of moments. The approach used in this paper, on the other
hand, allows for more than two partners, but does not guarantee a unique equilibrium.
4

Although general models of coalition formation date back at least to von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], most recent empirical work has focused on a few speciﬁc forms of coalition formation
games, such as two-sided matching games [Roth, 2008].
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The two approaches are thus complementary: the model presented below is applicable
to more cases, while the model used by Gordon and Knight has desirable properties
such as uniqueness.5
The remainder of the paper has the following structure: Section 1 presents the
model of local public goods and municipal mergers, Section 2 discusses how the
Japanese data can be analyzed using this model, Section 3 describes the estimation
strategy, and Section 4 presents the results.

1

Theory

1.1

Public Good Provision

There is a single country, populated by individuals that are distributed across a
plane.6 The location of these individuals is ﬁxed, and they are partitioned into
municipalities. For now, suppose that this arrangement of municipalities is also ﬁxed.
Each municipality m ∈ M provides a public good of quality qm to its Nm residents at
a single location θm on this plane. Providing this good costs qm c(Xm ), where the cost
c(Xm ) of providing one quality unit of the good depends on the covariates Xm of the
municipality, such as total population. Municipality m levies taxes at rate τm on tax
∑
base Ym = i∈m yi , where i indexes individuals.7 There is also a transfer from the
national government: municipality m receives Tm regardless of the quality of service
it chooses to provide. Feasible (qm , τm ) pairs are determined by the municipal budget
constraint
qm c(Xm ) = τm Ym + Tm .
(1)
The national government obtains funds from an outside source, and spends enough
of these on activities that are outside of the model that the marginal opportunity cost
5

Most empirical studies of political mergers thus far focus on American school districts. Miceli
[1993], the earliest example yet found, examines the trade-oﬀ that Connecticut school districts faced
between eﬃciencies of scale and locally optimal education quality. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby [2004]
use a much larger dataset, and examine the relationship between county-level heterogeneity and the
number of school districts and other local jurisdictions. While the estimates in each of these papers
imply a type of coalition formation game, they do not present an explicit coalition formation model.
6
This model is based on Greenberg and Weber [1986], Demange [1994], and in particular Alesina
and Spolaore [2003].
7
Treating m as a set rather than an index number is slightly non-standard, but eliminates the
need for additional notation when discussing estimation in Section 3.
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of providing transfers can be treated as constant. Let this marginal cost of funds for
the national government be b.
Individual utility is assumed to take the following additively separable form:
ui (qm , τm , θm ) = β0 log((1 − τm )yi ) + β1 log(qm − β3 ) + β2 ℓ(i, θm ) + ϵm ,

(2)

where β3 is some minimum level of public good provision, and ℓ(i, θ) is the distance
between the location of individual i on the plane and the location θ of the public
good provided by the municipality that i is a member of.
The ﬁrst two terms of this utility function have Stone-Geary form, with the minimum level of the private good set to zero. As these are the only terms that contain
∗
qm or τm , all individuals will share the same ideal point τm
for taxation. To see this,
note that the above equation can be rewritten to treat income as an individual ﬁxed
eﬀect:
ui (qm , τm , θm ) = β0 log(1 − τm ) + β1 log(qm − β3 ) + β2 ℓ(i, θm ) + αi + ϵm ,

(3)

where αi = β0 log(yi ). On the other hand, there is no agreement among individuals
regarding the location θm at which the public good should be provided. The set of
∗
feasible points is a plane, and thus choosing θm
is a multidimensional policy decision,
a problem which has no single accepted solution concept.
To resolve this, political decision-making at both the local and national level is
assumed to take place in a probabilistic voting framework, with the standard result
that the selected policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities. This is
discussed in more detail in Appendix A. At the local level, assume that equal weight
is given to all individuals: the local politician acts as a Benthamite social planner.
On the other hand, assume that while the national government uses equal weights for
individuals within a given municipality, it might have unequal weights across munici∗
∗
∗
policies chosen by the local
, and θm
, qm
palities. Thus, for each municipality m the τm
government are exactly the policies the national government would want the municipality to select, but the national government might choose to provide comparatively
large transfers to certain municipalities while giving little to some others.
Speciﬁcally, assume that the transfer to municipality m takes the form Tm = T (Xm , ψ)
for some parameter vector ψ, and let wm be the total weight placed on individuals
in that municipality by the national government. Then the national government’s
6

problem is
max
ψ

W (T (X, ψ))
∑
∑
W (T ) =
wm umm (Tm ) − b
Tm .
m∈M

(4)

m∈M

Here umm (Tm ) corresponds to the max of the local politician’s objective function in
municipality m, given transfers Tm :8
∗
∗
∗
) + α m + ϵm
− β3 ) + β2 ℓm (θm
) + β1 log(qm
umm (Tm ) = β0 log(1 − τm

(5)

where
αm =

1 ∑
αi
Nm i∈m

ℓm (θ) =

1 ∑
ℓ(i, θ)
Nm i∈m

and the optimal policies for τ , q and θ are given by
β0 Ym + Tm − β3 c(Xm )
β0 + β1
Ym
β1 Ym + Tm − β3 c(Xm )
∗
qm
=
+ β3
β0 + β1
c(Xm )
∗
τm
=1−

(6)

∗
θm
= argmin ℓm (θ).
θ

The solution to the national government’s problem in (4) will satisfy the ﬁrst order
conditions
∂W (T (X, ψ))
=0
(7)
∂ψk
and if there are no restrictions on what transfers the national government can make
this simpliﬁes to
wm (β0 + β1 )
Tm = β3 c(Xm ) − Ym +
(8)
b
for each municipality m.9 In the special case where all individuals have the same y,
8

The second m subscript will be used to indicate mergers, considered in the following subsection.
To derive this optimization problem, plug Equations 6 into Equation 3, and drop all the terms
that do not include T .
9
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and the government weights all individuals equally, Equation 8 further simpliﬁes to
Tm = β3 c(Xm ) − aYm ,

(9)

+β1
.
where a = 1 − β0yb
Equations 7 - 9 assume that the partition of individuals into municipalities is ﬁxed.
If changes such as municipal mergers are possible, then transfer policies satisfying the
conditions above may no longer be optimal.

1.2

Municipal Mergers

Consider two possible types of municipal mergers: mergers that are voluntarily agreed
upon by the involved municipalities (“decentralized”), and mergers that are mandated
by the national government (“centralized”). In some situations the national government may prefer to implement the former, and in others, the latter. This will be
illustrated via three simple examples.
The basic setup for both types of mergers is the same.10 Let S ⊂ M be a coalition
of municipalities that will merge together, and S ⊂ 2M the set of all possible coalitions, including singletons. For each coalition S, the municipalities in S are permanently eliminated and a single new amalgamated municipality is created. The set of all
∪
possible partitions π of municipalities into coalitions is Π = {π|π ⊂ S ,
π = M }.
An amalgamated municipality behaves exactly as outlined above in Section 1.1,
and is not involved in any further mergers. The utility for individual i in merger S is
thus as in Equation 3 above, except replacing m with S:
ui (τS , qS , θS ) = β0 log(1 − τS ) + β1 log(qS − β3 ) + β2 ℓ(i, θS ) + αi + ϵS .

(10)

Assume that there is perfect information with the possible exception that the national government may not be able to observe ϵ. Also assume that while the national
government commits in advance to making a transfer TS to the amalgamated municipality it is not possible for the municipalities in S to commit to a given τS , qS ,
or θS in advance of the merger. Finally, assume that the suﬃcient conditions for a
unique (q ∗ , τ ∗ , θ∗ ) political equilibrium, described in Appendix A, hold for all potential mergers. With these assumptions, the post merger choice of qS∗ , τS∗ , and θS∗ is
10

Notation in this section is based on that used by Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez [2001].
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known in advance for every potential coalition S, and is exactly as in Equation 6,
except replacing municipality m with coalition S.
The payoﬀ for municipality m participating in coalition S can be described as in
Equation 5:11
umS = β0 log(1 − τS∗ ) + β1 log(qS∗ − β3 ) + β2 ℓm (θS∗ ) + αm + ϵS .

(11)

Now consider the diﬀerence in payoﬀs for municipality m of participating in coalition S versus remaining a singleton:12
∗
))
umS − umm = β0 (log(1 − τS∗ ) − log(1 − τm
∗
+ β1 (log(qS∗ − β3 ) − log(qm
− β3 ))
∗
+ β2 (ℓm (θS∗ ) − ℓm (θm
))

(12)

+ ϵS − ϵm ,
The payoﬀs to municipality m considered in Equation 12 depend only on the characteristics of m and S, and a transfer policy that the national government has already
committed to.13 Municipal mergers are thus being treated as a pure hedonic coalition
formation game, where the payoﬀ to each player depends only on the coalition to
which they belong, and not on what other coalitions occur.14
First, consider the case where mergers are eﬀected via a decentralized process,
11

The ﬁrst term in Equation 5 is the utility received by individuals in municipality m from their
private consumption. Due to the log functional form, the income term itself becomes the ﬁxed eﬀect
αm , following Equation 3. The ﬁrst term will thus be the same for all municipalities participating in
coalition S, as the tax rate is by assumption the same throughout a given amalgamated municipality.
Similarly, the level of public goods is also assumed to be the same within the same amalgamated
municipality. Thus, the second term will also be the same for all municipalities participating in
coalition S, as all residents are assumed to value public goods equally. The third term, however,
takes into account distance to the location where the public service is provided, and this may diﬀer
substantially between municipalities in S. For example, if residents of m would be close to θS∗ , while
residents of m′ would be far away, then the disutility from distance will be less severe for m than
for m′ if coalition S occurs.
12
For simplicity, the payoﬀ to the singleton merger {m} is denoted by umm , following Equation
5, rather than um{m} .
3 c(XS )
13
The ﬁrst term is positive if the tax rate chosen in the merger is lower: YS +TS −β
>
YS
Ym +Tm −β3 c(Xm )
. The second term
Ym
YS +TS −β3 c(XS )
m −β3 c(Xm )
> Ym +Tc(X
.
c(XS )
m)

is positive if the quality of the public good provided is higher:

The third term (the diﬀerence in disutility from distance) will
∗
be zero or negative so long as distance is undesirable (β2 < 0), because θm
minimizes ℓm .
14
This is the game introduced by Dreze and Greenberg [1980], except without the possibility of
even within-coalition transfers.
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where a merger requires approval from all participating municipalities, and assume
that this decentralized decision-making involves each municipality making decisions
based on the utility function in Equation 5.15 Here, the inability for municipalities
to negotiate transfers may prevent some coalitions from forming. To see this, rewrite
Equation 5 as
umS = vmS + ϵS
(13)
and consider the following example:
Example 1. Suppose that there are two municipalities with identical characteristics,
the cost function c has constant eﬃciencies of scale, and the only possible merger is
S = {m, m′ } with vmm = vmS = v. Then if ϵm > 0, ϵm′ < 0, |ϵm | > |ϵm′ |, the merger
will not occur.
If transfers between municipalities were possible, and u did not exhibit too much
curvature in private consumption, then m would oﬀer a transfer to m′ in exchange
for m′ agreeing to the merger, and the merger would occur. However, the payoﬀs in
Equation 12 do not allow for this sort of inter-municipality payment to be negotiated.
The national government thus might wish to mandate mergers instead of allowing
decentralized mergers. If the national government has perfect information then it will
mandate that this merger occur when
(umS − umm )wm + (um′ S − um′ m′ )wm′ > 0

(14)

if the national government’s transfer policy is as given in Equation 8.
On the other hand, if the national government does not know ϵ then it may
choose to implement decentralized mergers instead of mandating a certain pattern of
municipal mergers:
Example 2. If, in the case described in Example 1, the national government weights
all individuals equally, is not restricted in the transfers it can make, and does not
observe ϵ, then if E[ϵm − ϵS ] = E[ϵm′ − ϵS ] = 0 the national government will choose
to implement a decentralized merger policy.
15

As discussed below, with this sort of decentralized system, once there are multiple potential
mergers involving some of the same municipalities it may no longer be obvious which mergers will
occur. For now, however, consider the case where each municipality can participate in only one
merger.
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A centralized merger policy would have expected payoﬀ of v, regardless of whether
the merger is mandated or prohibited, because with the optimal transfer scheme in
this case there is no diﬀerence in total transfers. The decentralized policy, on the
other hand, will result in a merger when both ϵS − ϵm > 0 and ϵS − ϵm′ > 0, and
no merger otherwise. This improves on either centralized policy choice, and thus the
national government will choose to implement decentralized mergers even if it had
the option of controlling mergers centrally.
If the government has decided to implement a decentralized merger policy, then
the optimal transfer policy may not be the same as that given in the preceding section:
Example 3. Suppose that the situation is as described in Example 2, except now
suppose that c exhibits eﬃciencies of scale. Then if ϵ has full support, the transfer
policy in Equation 8 is not optimal for decentralized mergers.
To see this, let p(T ) be the probability that the merger will occur if the government
chooses transfer vector T . As in Equation 13, let vmS (T ) be the non-idiosyncratic
component of umS (T ). The national government’s problem is
max
T

p(T )(vmS (T ) + E[ϵS |π ∗ = {S}, T ] − bTS )
+(1 − p(T ))(vmm (T ) + E[ϵm |π ∗ = {{m}, {m′ }}, T ] − 2bTm ).

(15)

where π ∗ is the partition that is actually observed, which depends on T as well as ϵ.
Increasing TS helps to resolve two externalities, as local governments consider neither
their partners’ payoﬀs nor the national budget when making merger decisions. Thus,
the transfer policy that was optimal for the national government when municipal
boundaries were ﬁxed is no longer optimal when there is the possibility of municipal
mergers.16
16

Start with the transfer policy given by Equation 8, and consider a small deviation that increases
transfers to the municipalities if they merge and decreases transfers by an equivalent total amount
if they do not. The cost of this deviation is that the transfer policy is no longer optimal given
ﬁxed boundaries. This cost is second-order. On the other hand, there are two ﬁrst-order beneﬁts.
First, because c exhibits eﬃciencies of scale then the national government spends less money in
expectation because T (XS ) < 2T (Xm ) for the policy given by Equation 8. Second, in the case
where one municipality prefers the merger but the other is indiﬀerent, the indiﬀerent municipality
does not internalize the beneﬁts of the merger to its partner, but could be encouraged to merge via
a higher TS .
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1.3

Solution Concept

While in the examples presented thus far it has been intuitively clear for any given
ϵ which mergers would occur if the process were decentralized, unfortunately there
are other situations where the decentralized outcome is not so obvious. Consider, for
example, the classic “roommates problem”:
Example 4 (Gale and Shapley 1962). Suppose M = {1, 2, 3} and preferences are
{1, 2, 3} ≺1 {1} ≺1 {1, 3} ≺1 {1, 2},
{1, 2, 3} ≺2 {2} ≺2 {1, 2} ≺2 {2, 3},
{1, 2, 3} ≺3 {3} ≺3 {2, 3} ≺3 {1, 3}.

(16)

Given these preferences, there is no intuitively obvious solution to this coalition
formation game: Players 2 and 3 would both like to deviate from the {{1, 2}, {3}}
partition, and there are similar deviations for other partitions.
To resolve this issue, Ray and Vohra [1997] develop a solution concept based on
only considering reﬁnements: deviations that involve a subset of a single coalition,
and thus result in moving from a coarser partition to a ﬁner one. They then deﬁne the
coarsest partitions that do not have any reﬁnements as the solution to the coalition
formation game. In the roommates example, then, the {{1, 2}, {3}} partition would
be considered stable, as the {2, 3} coalition is not a subset of a coalition in the
partition. There would thus be three solutions to Example 4.
The environment considered in this paper is simpler than that considered in Ray
and Vohra [1997], and thus a simpler solution concept can be used:
Theorem 1. Let Π∗ be the set of partitions that do not have any deviations that are
reﬁnements or coarsenings. Then Π∗ exists, is not empty, and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Although Π∗ is unique, it may contain multiple partitions. Multiplicity of solutions
is a fundamental property of “roommate-type” coalition formation games [Barberà
and Gerber, 2007]. Intuitively, as Example 4 is symmetric, any plausible solution concept that gives {{1, 2}, 3} should also give the partition with {2, 3} and the partition
with {1, 3} as solutions as well.
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The interpretation of Π∗ is as follows. If π ∈
/ Π∗ , then there is some coalition that
would deﬁnitely deviate from π, and thus π should not be observed as the outcome of
the coalition formation game. On the other hand, if π ∈ Π∗ , then π might be observed
as the outcome of the game. Theorem 1 thus rules out partitions that should deﬁnitely
not occur, but does not specify precisely what partition will occur.17

2 Japanese Context
2.1

Public Good Provision

Japan is a unitary state divided into 47 prefectures, whose boundaries have remained
roughly unchanged since the 1890s. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, each of these prefectures is divided into municipalities. Municipalities are responsible for providing
public services in six major areas: ﬁreﬁghting, public works, education, welfare, industry, and administration.18 In order to apply the theoretical model presented in
Section 1 to these municipalities, a number of simplifying assumptions are necessary.
In particular, terms in the municipal budget constraint (Equation 1) and the individual utility function (Equation 3) need to be matched to actually observed data.
Begin by considering the municipal budget, as it constrains the ﬁrst two terms of the
individual utility function.
The three elements of Equation 1 are expenditures on local services, transfers
from the national government, and local taxes. Beginning in the 1950s, the Japanese
government established a “national standard” reference quality for local government
services. To ensure that every municipality had suﬃcient funds to oﬀer services
above this minimum level, the national government developed a complicated system
of transfers, now called the “Local Allocation Tax”.19 In the period before the Heisei
municipal mergers began, transfers to municipalities were determined by a formula
17

The approach used by Gordon and Knight [2009] to guarantee uniqueness is not possible in this
case because the ℓ(i, θm ) in Equation 3 generates the possibility of preference cycles as in Example
4. The non-cooperative approach used by Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo [2003] requires additional
assumptions regarding the exact process by which coalitions were formed.
18
Public goods that generate substantial externalities appear to be provided by higher levels
of government, rather than by municipalities. For example, waterways and major roads are the
responsibility of prefectures.
19
The slightly-confusing name is due to the fact that it is an allocation to local governments from
taxes collected by the national government.
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quite similar to Equation 9:
Tm = max(c̃(Xm ) − .75τ̄ Ym , 0)

(17)

where c̃(Xm ) is the national government’s estimate of the cost to a municipality with
characteristics Xm of providing public goods at the “national standard” quality, and
τ̄ Ym the amount of tax revenue the municipality should be able to collect if taxes are
charged at the “standard” rate. The cost estimate c̃ is sometimes referred to as the
“Standard Fiscal Need”, and is calculated by a formula equivalent to
c̃(Xm ) =

24
∑

Xmk · c̄k (1 + H̃k (Xm )) + ζm .

(18)

k=1

Here the public good is viewed as a sum of 24 component goods, such as ﬁreﬁghting, care for the elderly, resident registration, and so forth. Each of these component
goods is associated with a quantity measure Xmk and an estimated unit cost c̄k , and
an adjustment coeﬃcient H̃k . The adjustment coeﬃcient is created by multiplying
and adding together a set of (usually) decreasing splines determined by Xm . These
adjustments generally resulted in higher per capita cost estimates for smaller municipalities, as in the case of the dankai (“step”) adjustment shown in Figure 4. There are
also some additional costs ζm that are not generally subject to adjustment. Further
details regarding Equation 18 are provided in Appendix C.
To match this system to the theoretical model presented in Section 1, assume that
each municipality must choose a single quality q at which to provide all the component public goods: it is not possible, for example, for municipality m to choose to
f
r
provide quality qm
= 5 ﬁreﬁghting, but only quality qm
= 3 resident registration. Furthermore, suppose that the cost estimate c̃(X) produced by the national government
has the right general form, but with possibly incorrect adjustments H̃. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that the true cost of one quality unit of the public good is
c(Xm ) =

24
∑

Xmk · c̄k · (1 + Hk (Xm )) + ζm

(19)

k=1

and assume that any bias in the Japanese government’s estimate of c̃ can be described
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by parameters ψ in the following way:
c̃(Xm ) =

24
∑

Xmk · c̄k · (ψ0 + ψ1 Hk (Xm )) + ζm .

(20)

k=1

As there are no natural units for quality, use the normalization ψ0 = 1 for the
Japanese’s government’s estimates prior to the merger period.20
Fitting actual municipal taxes to the model in Section 1 requires the same sort
of assumptions as for service provision. The principal source of local tax revenues
is property tax, but there are multiple tax bases each of which can be taxed at a
diﬀerent tax rate, while the model in Section 1 has only a single tax base Y with a
single tax rate τ . To resolve this issue, use the same approach as for the cost of public
services: assume that municipalities must tax each tax base in direct proportion to
the national government “standard” tax rates on these tax bases. This appears to be
a reasonable assumption, as tax rates do not diﬀer much from the standard rates.
An additional issue with taxation is that there is some bureaucratic imprecision
regarding the τ̄ Ym term in Equation 17, sometimes referred to as “Standard Fiscal
Revenue”. While de jure, municipalities are allowed to set their own tax rates, de
facto it appears that rates less than τ̄ may be prohibited. Issues regarding taxation
are discussed in more detail in Appendix C. Below, parameters will be estimated
both for the case where τ̄ acts as a minimum tax rate, and where τ ∗ can be chosen
freely.
The municipal budget constraint consists of the three terms just discussed: taxes,
transfers, and expenditures. The municipal tax base and national government transfers are available from published sources, described further in Appendix C. The cost
of providing the public good, however, is unknown and will be estimated as described
∗
in the following section. For a given cost function, and for given parameters β, the τm
∗
and qm
that will be selected by each municipality can be calculated using the formulae
from Equation 6. The ﬁrst two terms of the individual utility function (Equation 3)
can then be calculated for any individual and municipality.21
The remaining structural term in Equation 3 is distance, ℓ. This is taken to be
20

Here ψ1 is assumed to be the same for all component goods, which corresponds to the national government’s estimates of eﬃciencies of scale H̃ in Equation 18 having the form H̃k (Xm ) =
ψ1 Hk (Xm ).
21
The individual ﬁxed eﬀect αi can also be calculated, but because the data used involves choices
between coalitions, this term will always disappear, as shown in Equation 12.
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geographic distance, and is calculated using census grid square data on population.22
This is appropriate because the majority of local public services are provided at physical facilities, such as schools, nursing homes, libraries, and city hall itself.23 Surveys
conducted around the time of the recent mergers reveal a widespread perception that
there were unexploited eﬃciencies of scale in the provision of these services.24 It was
generally understood that a municipal merger involving a smaller municipality and
a larger one would result in the closure of city hall and some other facilities in the
smaller municipality, and that this would result in substantial cost savings. This
lead to a concern among residents of smaller municipalities that after a merger public
services would only be provided at a location much further away than was the case
currently. As an increase in geographic distance to public facilities was perceived as
a major cost of a municipal merger, it seems appropriate to use geography as the
metric for heterogeneity in the structural part of the model.25

2.2

Municipal Mergers

If a coalition S of municipalities decided to amalgamate, transfers would in principle
be calculated as in Equation 17:26
TS = max(c̃(XS ) − .75τ̄ YS , 0)

(21)

which would result in savings for the national government, as H̃ in Equation 18
usually decreased with size. Thus, local residents would oppose mergers that the
national government would like to see occur. The exact behaviour of residents was
22

These calculations are described in more detail in Appendix C.
Although many services at city hall could be accessed via mail, telephone, or the internet, it is
common and in some cases required to visit in person.
24
The most popular response to questions regarding the potential beneﬁts of municipal mergers
was “avoid duplication of facilities / avoid useless capital expenditures” in Kyoto, “reduce expenditures by improving administrative eﬃciency, eliminating duplicate facilities, and reducing personnel”
in Yamanashi prefecture, “reduce personnel expenses” in Akita, and “reduce personnel and other
expenditures and improve eﬃciency” in Okinawa. Unfortunately, these surveys are diﬃcult to analyze quantitatively, as they were only conducted in a few prefectures, and a diﬀerent questionnaire
was used in each prefecture.
25
A restriction imposed throughout this paper is that individuals do not move or otherwise change
their ideal point. A similar model could be constructed, however, with each individual owning a
home, the value of the home varying with distance to the public good, and people voting to maximize
their real estate value.
26
Some merger incentives were oﬀered, as described below.
23
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determined in part by the relationship between the true cost function c and the
national government’s estimate c̃.
During the ﬁscal diﬃculties of the early 1990s, the Japanese national government
implemented a series of reforms designed to reduce the total transfers provided to
municipalities while attempting to minimize the negative eﬀects of this decrease.
First, the government substantially reduced transfers, particularly to the smallest
municipalities. This was eﬀected mainly by replacing H̃k with H̃knew , which was less
generous towards smaller municipalities as is shown in Figure 5.27 These new transfers
T new provided smaller municipalities with an incentive to merge so as to avoid having
to either sharply reduce the quality of service that they provided to their residents,
or increase the tax rate charged.
Second, with these new transfers in place, the government then allowed municipalities to keep more of the savings from a merger. The “merger” formula
TSmerger =

∑

Tmnew

(22)

m∈S

had previously been used for up to ﬁve years following a merger, but in 1999 this was
increased to ten years starting from the date of the merger.28 This incentive began
to be phased out in 2006, which motivated many municipalities to ﬁnalize mergers in
2005.29
A ﬁnal incentive for mergers was the Gappei Tokureisai, special subsidized bond
issues allowed for municipalities planning amalgamation.30 The value of these bonds
27

Although this change took place around 2003, it was announced earlier.
An intermediate amount between TSnew and TSmerger was oﬀered for years 11-15 following a
merger.
29
By 2006 there were only 1,844 municipalities remaining, down from 3,255 at the start of the
merger period. The situation in Shizuoka Prefecture at that time is shown in Figure 6. A small
number of mergers occurred during the phase-out period, reducing the ﬁnal number of municipalities
to 1,750 in 2010; for the purposes of this paper, these mergers are treated as though they were
ﬁnalized prior to 2006, and implementation was simply delayed for exogenous reasons. Explaining
why a coalition would not form during the 1999-2005 period, but would under the progressively
less-advantageous policies in place in 2006-2010 would require adding elements to the model, such as
arrival of new information, that would substantially complicate the analysis. This paper thus treats
the entire 12 years as a single period.
30
The oﬃcial explanation for these bonds was to eliminate any direct ﬁnancial cost of merging,
such as the construction of a new city hall; however, the bonds appeared to allow signiﬁcant capital
expenditures beyond the actual costs of amalgamation. Relative to the incentive provided by the
switch from c̃m to c̃new
in the calculation of transfers, these bonds have a relatively small eﬀect
m
on incentives to merge, and thus for simplicity the the bonds are treated entirely as an additional
28
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is calculated based on the subsidy oﬀered, using information from Ishihara [2000].
Municipalities are presumed to able to save in order to equalize the quality of public
services and the municipal tax rate between the decade immediately following the
merger, when incentives are provided, and following decades. As the rules for all the
ﬁnancial incentives for mergers are known, for each coalition S the optimal tax rate
and public good quality can be calculated for any given cost function and parameters
β.31
Although a large number of mergers occurred overall, very few of these mergers
involved municipalities in the most metropolitan prefectures. Deﬁne a prefecture as
“metropolitan” if fewer than 10% of its municipalities have a population of less than
10000, and deﬁne a prefecture as “rural” if more than 65% of its municipalities have
a population of less than 10000. Table 1 shows summary statistics for municipalities
in diﬀerent classes of prefectures. Municipalities in metropolitan prefectures were
much less likely to merge during the merger period than those in the other sorts of
prefectures.

3

Estimation

There are four parameters of interest from Equation 3: the value of private consumption (β0 ), the value of public consumption (β1 ), the disutility of distance (β2 ), and
the minimum quality for the public good (β3 ). An additional parameter of interest
is the relationship between the Japanese government estimates of eﬃciencies of scale
and the true eﬃciencies of scale: this is ψ1 in Equation 20. One hypothesis of particular interest is that there are in reality no eﬃciencies of scale, but this corresponds
to ψ1 → ∞ and is thus diﬃcult to test using the parameterization of Equation 20.
Thus, deﬁne β4 = ψ11 .32 The case where there are no eﬃciencies of scale in the production of public goods then corresponds to β4 = 0, and the case where the national
government’s estimates are correct corresponds to β4 = 1.
These β parameters can be estimated by examining the mergers that actually
occurred in Japan and comparing them to ones that could have occurred but did not,
incentive, with the direct ﬁnancial costs of merging ignored.
31
An overview of the rules described in the “Special Municipal Merger Law” is described in Appendix A.1.1.
32
This then implies that Hk (Xm ) = β4 H̃k (Xm ), which is more convenient from an empirical
perspective, because H̃k is known while Hk is not.
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using the data on national government transfers and eﬃciencies of scale described in
Section 2 and further explained in Appendix C. To do this, ﬁrst rewrite the utility
function in Equation 13 to make explicit the fact that the values of the β parameters
aﬀect the structural component, but do not aﬀect the idiosyncratic component:
umS (β) = vmS (β) + ϵS .

(23)

Assume that ϵ is distributed normally, with the distribution of ϵS identical to that of
ϵS ′ , but not necessarily independent. Furthermore, note that, as is standard in discrete
choice models, multiplying u by a positive constant has no eﬀect on preferences. Thus,
as a normalization, multiply such that ϵS ∼ N (0, 1). Let β 0 be the true value of β.
Estimation will be based on four types of moment inequalities:
1. At β 0 , it should be possible to ﬁnd values of the idiosyncratic shocks that
rationalize the observed mergers, and are not “too extreme” relative to the
N (0, 1) distribution from which they are assumed to have been drawn.
2. At β 0 , if the national government had not implemented the merger promotion
policies, the number of mergers that would have occurred should not be “too
high” relative to the number of mergers that occurred prior to 1999.
3. At β 0 , the number of mergers actually observed in metropolitan prefectures
should not be “too low” relative to the number of mergers predicted in these
prefectures by the model.
4. At β 0 , the tax rates actually charged by municipalities should be “similar” to
those that the model predicts should be charged.
The technical deﬁnitions for terms in quotation marks will be given below. The ﬁrst
two types of moment inequalities should hold for metropolitan prefectures, mixed
prefectures, and rural prefectures, as deﬁned at the end of Section 2. The remainder of
this section has the following form: ﬁrst, the covariance of ϵS and ϵS ′ is discussed, and
then the details of each of the above four types of moment inequalities are presented.
Finally, conﬁdence sets for the estimated parameters are calculated.
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3.1

Structure of Idiosyncratic Shocks

There are three important points regarding the set S of all potential mergers. First, it
is potentially very large, containing up to 2M elements. Second, it is not always clear
which coalitions should be in this set: for example, no coalitions of size greater than 15
are observed in the data, but there was also no government policy that expressly prohibited a size 50 coalition from forming. Finally, it is implausible that ϵ is i.i.d across
diﬀerent coalitions: if S = {m1 , m2 , ..., m14 , m15 }, and S ′ = {m1 , m2 , ..., m14 }, then
a reasonable econometric model should have ϵS correlated with ϵS ′ . The following
construction makes it possible to generate shocks that are ϵS ∼ N (0, 1), not independent but identically distributed, and to consider the shocks associated with some
coalitions without enumerating all potential coalitions. The basic assumption comes
from the literature on ethnic fragmentation: under certain conditions, heterogenous
jurisdictions produce bad results for all residents, not only those far from the median
voter. While Japan is not known for extreme ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity, one
could imagine even minor cultural diﬀerences playing such a role.33
First, suppose that each individual resident makes an i.i.d. draw, ωi ∼ N (0, 1),
representing i’s cultural identity. For municipality m with population Nm , the sample
mean and sample variance of these draws will be
Nm
1 ∑
ωi
ω̄m =
Nm i=1
m
∑
1
(ωi − ω̄m )2 ,
=
Nm − 1 i=1

(24)

N

s2m

(25)

because there are Nm residents making i.i.d. draws. Within-municipality heterogeneity is captured by the sample variance, so let
ϵm = −f (Xm ) log s2m ,

(26)

and likewise for any coalition S. Here f (X) > 0 is a function that generates weights
such for any coalition S = A ∪ B, then f (XS ) > f (XA ) and f (XS ) > f (XB ). That
is, heterogeneity is relatively more important for larger municipalities.
Deﬁning ω̄S and s2S in the same way for any coalition S, the standard relationship
33

Costa and Kahn [2003] provides a discussion of some of these issues.
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for sample variances will hold:
∑
s2S =

2
m∈S (Nm − 1)sm +

∑

∑
m∈S

m′ ∈S

Nm Nm′ (ω̄m −ω̄m′ )2
NS

NS − 1

(27)

Now deﬁne the vectors ω̄M and sM to be the sample means and standard deviations
for all municipalities. It is possible to calculate ϵS for any coalition S given only ω̄M
and sM . Let ϵ(ω̄M , sM ) be the vector resulting from this calculation. The elements
of both ω̄M and sM have known distributions, which will be helpful when computing
moment inequalities.
With this construction of ϵ, for any guess β̂ for the parameter vector, any observed
partition can be rationalized: simply choose s2S suﬃciently close to zero if S is in
the observed partition, and large otherwise, and then choose ω̄S and ω̄S ′ such that
(ω̄S − ω̄S ′ )2 is suﬃciently large to discourage any coarsenings into larger coalitions.
Finally, using the approximation
log s2S ≃ log (1 + δS ),

δS ∼ N (0,

2
)
NS − 1

≃ δS
√
it is the case that if f (XS ) =

3.2

NS −1
,
2

then ϵS ∼ N (0, 1), n.i.i.d, as desired.

Moment Inequalities

The ﬁrst moment inequality used is based on rationalizing the observed coalition
structure. First choose an arbitrary function h(ω̄, s|X).34 Then deﬁne h∗ as
h∗ (π|X, β) = min h(ω̄M , sM |X)
ω̄M ,sM

s.t. π ∈ Π∗ (ϵ(ω̄M , sM )|X, β)

(28)

where Π∗ is the stable set evaluated at parameters β, and with idiosyncratic shocks
ϵ as determined by ω̄M and sM . Thus, h∗ is a lower bound for h given that partition
π was observed, and that parameter values are β. It is always the case that
0
, s0M |X) ≥ h∗ (π 0 |X, β 0 )
h(ω̄M
34

(29)

Good choices for h seem to be functions that will give high values when ω̄ and s are extreme
relative to the distributions from which they were assumed to have been drawn.

21

0
where ω̄M
and s0M are the true values that were drawn for ω̄M and sM , respectively, and
0
π 0 is the partition that resulted from those draws. This is because Π∗ (ϵ(ω̄M
, s0M )|β 0 )
0
must contain π 0 , otherwise π 0 could not have been observed, and thus (ω̄M
, s0M ) could
be chosen in Equation 28. Consider the moment

g1 (π, β|X) = Eh(ω̄M , sM |X) − h∗ (π|X, β).

(30)

This will be positive in expectation at the true parameter value β 0 , because
Eg1 (π, β 0 |X) = Eh(ω̄M , sM |X) − Eh∗ (π, β 0 )

(31)

≥0
because Inequality 29 holds at every realization of (ω̄M , sM ) and π, and thus also
holds in expectation. Computation is explained in more detail in Appendix D.1, and
a very simple example is given in Appendix D.4.
The second moment inequality used is based on the following assumption: in the
absence of any change in national government policy, merger activity in 1999-2010
should not have been greater than merger activity in 1979-1999. That is, assume
that the increase in merger activity was caused by the change in national government
policy. There is little debate in Japan that the large number of mergers that occurred
during the 1999-2010 period were a result of policy changes made by the national
government. Figure 1 shows that the merger activity is in marked contrast to the
period before 1999: only 18 municipalities participated in mergers during the two
decades preceding the implementation of merger promotion policies.
Let µ∗Q be a lower bound on the number of mergers that the model predicts would
have occurred in the absence of any government policy change. The moment
g2 (Q, β|X) = Q − µ∗Q (β|X)

(32)

can then be used as a moment inequality, where Q is the number of municipalities
involved in mergers in the 1979-1998 period. Computation is explained in more detail
in Appendix D.2.
The third moment inequality used is based on the column in Table 1 showing
that very few mergers occurred in “metropolitan” prefectures, deﬁned in this paper
as prefectures with fewer than 10% of municipalities having a population of less than
22

10000. The same argument used in the previous subsection can thus be extended
to mergers actually observed during the merger period: given the national government’s actually implemented policies, the number of mergers observed should not be
anomalously low.
Speciﬁcally, let Q99 be the number of municipalities actually participating in mergers in the 1999-2010 period. Then the moment g3 (Q, β|X) = Q − µ∗Q (β|X), where FQ∗
is as deﬁned in the previous section, can be used as a moment inequality because
0
∗99
EQ g3 (Q99 , β 0 |X) = µ99
Q − µQ (β |X)

(33)

≥0
due to stochastic dominance and Q99 having been drawn from FQ .
The fourth and ﬁnal moment inequality used relies on the fact that tax rates that
are actually charged are observed for all municipalities. This is particularly interesting
in the merger period, where there is noticeable, although still low, dispersion in the
tax rates being charged. One complication here is that de facto, municipalities appear
not to be able to lower their tax rate below τ̄ , although they are free to charge a higher
rate. Even with this censoring, however, tax rates (after adjustment for the tax ﬂoor)
should be correctly predicted by the model. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the observed
tax rates are a function of optimal tax rates plus some noise:
∗∗
∗
τm
= max(τm
(β) + εm , τ̄ ),

(34)

∗
where τm
is taken from Equation 6. If the theoretical model is correct, then, including
additional terms should not improve the ﬁt of a Tobit regression. That is, if the
restriction γ = 0 is imposed on the model
∗∗
∗
τm
= max(τm
(β) + γXmk + εm , τ̄ ),

(35)

then if g4 (β, X) is the gradient for γ, evaluated at γ = 0, this can be used as a moment
equality.

23

4 Results
Results are shown in Table 2. Since mergers do not cross prefectural boundaries, each
prefecture is treated as a separate coalition formation game, and asymptotics are with
respect to the number of prefectures.35 Although the model is only set identiﬁed in
theory, the results show that the minimizer of the test statistic is a single point. This
result is standard in the literature.36
This value of β2 roughly implies that an individual would be willing to have a
municipal policy that was 1km more distant in exchange for about ¥3500 per year.37
Using this value of β2 , if the population of Japan were uniformly distributed across
the country, and a social planner could set entirely new boundaries for municipalities,
then the optimum size for a municipality would be
β0 log(

√
yNm − β3 c(Nm )
ym Nm − β3 c(Nm )
) + β1 log(
) + 0.377β2 Nm /340,
yNm
c(Nm )

(36)

where 0.377 is a coeﬃcient for the average distance to the centroid based on hexagonal
packing, and Pm /340 the area in square kilometres given the population density of
Japan (340 per km2 ). This formula yields an optimal municipal population of about
200,000. This suggests 635 municipalities for all of Japan, compared to the 1750
actually present at the end of the merger period.
The estimate for β3 indicates that the view of the government estimates of the
cost of providing public goods as an estimate of the cost of providing the “national
minimum” appears to be correct. There is a ﬁxed Stone-Geary style demand for
1.05 quality units of the public good, which is not statistically diﬀerent from 1 (that
is, the government cost estimates are the estimate for the minimum possible public
expenditure), but is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
On the other hand, β4 , the degree to which the central government’s estimates
of eﬃciencies of scale in the provision of public services match the true eﬃciencies
of scale, is estimated to be about 0.5. This means that two null hypothesis can be
35

There is one exception, involving a single municipality switching prefectures. It is treated as
though the municipality in question was always part of the “destination” prefecture.
36
When a large number of moment inequalities are used, there may not be any parameter vector
that satisﬁes all of them. This could be the result of idiosyncratic variation, or could indicate that
the model is misspeciﬁed. The models used to produce the estimates in Table 2 are not rejected at
the 95% level.
37
This is not statistically diﬀerent from the estimate of ¥1000 obtained in Hayashi, Nishikawa,
and Weese [2010], based on stated preference data regarding potential municipal mergers.
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rejected at very high conﬁdence levels: that there are no eﬃciencies of scale in the
provision of public goods (β4 = 0), and that the eﬃciencies of scale in the provision
of public goods are equal to the initial government estimates (β4 = 1).

4.1

Ineﬃciency and Alternative Policies

To calculate a measure of ineﬃciency, it is necessary to determine the national government’s objective function. Assume that weights per capita are equal for all individuals
in the same prefecture, and diﬀerences between prefectures are given by the formula
wm Nm = ϕ0 + ϕ1 seats per capitam

(37)

where “seats per capita” is the legislative representation allocated to the prefecture
of municipality m in the upper house of the national Diet.38
Next, assume that before the merger period the national government was maximizing its objective (4) under the assumption that boundaries were ﬁxed, and given
its weights on individuals. That is, the national government’s estimate of the cost
function c̃, which determines transfers through Equation 17 and is parameterized by
ψ as shown in Equation 20, was the argmax of W in Equation 4.
Using the β̂ from Column I of Table 2, ϕ̂0 and ϕ̂1 can be estimated via GMM.39
The estimate for the intercept, ϕ̂0 = −0.04, is not statistically signiﬁcant, while
the slope ϕ̂1 = 0.18 is. Thus, the hypothesis that the national government weights
all individual equally is rejected, while the hypothesis that the national government
weights individuals based on their legislative representation is not rejected. Now,
using these ϕ̂ estimates, some simple counterfactual analysis can be performed.
One parameter that is unknown is the cost of public funds during the merger
period. The assumption in this paper is that the national government’s policy change
38

This is an extremely simple measure of legislative malapportionment, as it ignores the lower
house entirely. Lower house malapportionment is more complex, and varies within prefecture. The
model presented in Section 1 does not work well with weights that diﬀer within the same prefecture,
because this implies that for some municipal mergers, the national government would want diﬀerent
local policies than the local government will implement, as the national government has diﬀerent
weights for diﬀerent individuals within the same (amalgamated) municipality. Thus, only upper
house malapportionment is used, as representation is at the prefectural level in the upper house.
39
The “tax ﬂoor” speciﬁcation is preferred both because it appears to ﬁt anecdotal evidence better,
and because in counterfactual policy exercises it prevents the national government from using the
transfer system to massively redistribute income from richer to poorer municipalities via negative
municipal tax rates.
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was prompted by an increase in this cost from b = 1 to some higher cost b′ > b.
Intuitively, the lowest beneﬁts for mergers will be when b′ ≃ b, and higher values of
b will lead to larger beneﬁts.40 Thus, assume the scenario that b′ = b.41
To determine the beneﬁt to the national government of the observed mergers
occurring, take the actual transfer policy used in the merger period and calculate a
lower bound for W from Equation 4 using weights ŵ calculated using ϕ̂ and Equation
37. An exact calculation is not possible, because W depends on u, which includes ϵ,
which is unobserved. The point of decentralizing the mergers, however, is to obtain
a conﬁguration that has good unobserved characteristics. Thus
W (T merger ) > V (T merger ) − b′
V (T merger ) =

∑

∑

TSmerger

S∈π 0

ŵS vmS (TSmerger ).

(38)

S∈π 0

In comparison to the national government’s objective function under the original municipal boundaries, the mergers provide a beneﬁt equivalent to about ¥160 billion of
public funds. This is likely a substantial underestimate of the beneﬁts, as it ignores idiosyncratic beneﬁts. An alternative estimate, assuming that idiosyncratic terms were
suﬃciently positive such that all municipalities participating in a merger preferred
that to remaining a singleton, gives an estimate about twice as large: ¥335 billion.
Now, suppose that, rather than relying on decentralized mergers, the government
had simply imposed the very boundaries that were actually observed post-merger.
The government could then have implemented a transfer policy very diﬀerent than
the one it actually chose, because there are no longer any incentive problems at the
municipal level regarding potential mergers. In the case where mergers were mandated, the optimal transfer policy would be ψ0′ = 1.03, ψ1′ = 1.09, which is very close
to the original transfer policy. Comparing this policy to the actual transfer speciﬁed
An upper bound for b′ can be calculated by assuming, following Example 3, that a cut in transfers
to non-merging municipalities would not result in a worse merger pattern. Using ϕ̂, and assuming
that this cut would have to take the form given in Equation 20, this bound can be calculated as
b′ < 1.4. For b′ ∈ [1, 1.4], the lowest beneﬁts for the observed mergers are indeed at b′ = 1.
41
One question here is why, if the cost of public funds did not change, the calculated beneﬁts
for mergers are positive. Municipal borders in Japan had remained mostly unchanged since the
1960s, and even if the borders set in the 1960s were optimal, beneﬁts to realignment were likely
appeared over time. If there are advantages to large one-shot rearrangements, rather than piecewise
modiﬁcations, then there is an option value to not implementing a municipal merger policy in any
given year. Positive beneﬁts are thus consistent with the policy not being implemented.
40

26

during the mergers, there a beneﬁt to the national government equivalent to ¥250
billion in public funds.
Finally, consider the case where the government chooses a merger pattern centrally. For simplicity, suppose that the government chose the transfer policy that it
actually implemented, even though this would be suboptimal. Even with this additional assumption, ﬁnding the optimal pattern of mergers is a diﬃcult combinatorial
problem. However, a relatively simple “greedy” algorithm yields a lower bound.42
This bound is a beneﬁt equivalent to ¥1150 billion in additional spending. If the
actually implemented mergers provided a beneﬁt equivalent to ¥335 billion, then the
optimal merger pattern would have provided the equivalent of an additional ¥815
billion. This suggests that either the information problems faced by the national government were very severe, or centralized mergers were not a feasible option for other
reasons. The optimal pattern calculated for these centralized mergers has a ﬁnal total
of 645 municipalities; however, unlike the calculated beneﬁt this is not a bound, and
thus the true optimal pattern could involve more or fewer municipalities. This number is very similar to the 635 municipalities calculated above under the assumption
of uniform population distribution and hexagonal packing, however, suggesting that
other approximation algorithms would likely yield similar results.

5 Conclusion
This paper examined the ineﬃciency arising from local decisions over boundary
changes, using Japanese data and an estimator based on moment inequalities. Estimation is feasible due to a special covariance structure assumed for the error term.
Municipalities take into account neither the beneﬁts of a merger to their merger
partners, nor its eﬀect on national spending. The national government thus chooses
a second-best transfer policy that provides less equalization but greater incentives for
municipalities to participate in mergers. The resulting merger pattern is also secondbest, with smaller mergers than the national government would have preferred. If
the national government had centralized the merger process, estimates suggest that
the post-merger political conﬁguration would have had only about 650 municipalities,
rather than the approximately 1750 actually observed.
42

Start by merging the pair of municipalities where the merger would produce the greatest beneﬁt.
Continue until there are no more mergers that will improve the objective function.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (for municipalities, by type of prefecture)
Units Metropolitan
Mixed
Rural
c̃ (std. ﬁscal need)
¥100,000,000
361.86
64.42
53.85
(776.37) (182.15) (169.60)
τ̄ Y (std. ﬁscal rev.)
¥100,000,000
281.60
40.84
24.75
(665.12) (146.98) (112.47)
POPULATION
100,000
2.04
0.34
0.23
(3.90)
(0.96)
(0.89)
AREA (sq. km.)
100
0.45
0.98
1.93
(0.54)
(1.06)
(2.05)
CITY (vs. town/vill.)
%
70.83
19.51
16.00
MERGED_PRE_1999
%
1.39
1.41
0.00
MERGED_POST_1999
%
6.25
67.58
64.64
# municipalities
144
2486
625
# prefectures
3
36
8
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Table 2: Dependent variable is vmS , (structural) utility to muni m from merger S

CONSUMPTION (β0 )
GOVERNMENT (β1 )
DISTANCE (β2 )
STONE_GEARY (β3 )
EFF_OF_SCALE (β4 )
N (prefectures)

tax ﬂoor
200.99∗∗
(110.0, 440.0)
4.58∗∗
(2.0, 12.0)
−0.21∗∗
(−0.35, −0.02)
1.05∗∗
(0.95, 1.13)
0.49∗∗
(0.38, 0.61)
47

∗∗

no tax ﬂoor
98.91∗∗
(60.0, 350.0)
2.73
(0.0, 9.0)
−0.25∗
(−0.40, 0.0)
1.03∗∗
(0.94, 1.25)
0.55∗∗
(0.29, 0.68)
47

95% level
90% level
(a, b) Extreme points for this variable in (ﬁve dimensional) 95% conﬁdence set
tax ﬂoor: municipalities cannot charge a tax rate less than τ̄ , the national government’s reference tax rate
∗
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Figure 1:
Japanese municipalities, 1970−present
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Figure 4: Adjustment coeﬃcient based on number of personnel required
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Figure 5:
Decrease in Standard Financial Need
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Figure 6: Mergers in Shizuoka Prefecture
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A

Voting Model

The variables determined by a political process at the local level, given a certain
municipality m, are qm , τm , and θm . The national government chooses the transfer
function T . Due to the form of the utility function in Equation 3, all individuals
∗
∗
agree on the optimal level for the public good, qm
, and the tax rate, τm
. For the
other political choices, however, diﬀerent individuals will have diﬀerent ideal points,
and each of these may be multidimensional: the location θm of the public good is
geographic (latitude and longitude), and the transfer function is chosen from a space
of functions which in Section 4 will be assumed to be two dimensional. A very simple
model of the political process at both the local and national level gives the result
that the policy selected is a weighted sum of individual utilities. To obtain this
result, make the following assumptions:
1. There are two identical oﬃce-motivated candidates that run on policy platforms
that they can commit to.
2. Voting in elections is determined via a probabilistic voting model where vote
probabilities are linear in utility diﬀerence between the two candidates.
3. There is a continuum of voters.
4. ∀θ, θ′ , ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), the set of voters i such that
ui (γθ + (1 − γ)θ′ ) > γui (θ) + (1 − γ)ui (θ′ )
has positive measure.
With these assumptions, the unique political equilibrium is for both candidates to
∗
propose θm
to maximize the sum of individual utilities: this is Theorem 4 in Banks
and Duggan [2005].43

A.1

Japanese Context

Municipal politics in Japan involves both a mayor and a municipal council, and thus
there is in reality more than the one decision maker assumed above; however, with the
43

An additional requirement of Theorem 4 of Banks and Duggan [2005] is that for each voter,
utility is (weakly) concave with respect to the policy choice. The utility function given in Equation
3 is concave in θ, although it is not strictly concave.
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exception of very large “designated municipalities” the council is elected on an entirely
at-large basis, without wards or other subdivisions. The mayor has veto power, which
can be over-ruled by a 2/3rds vote of the municipal council. Given the lack of wards
in the municipal council, it is not entirely clear how or why policies proposed by
council might diverge from policies proposed by the mayor, although examples of this
sort of conﬂict can be found in municipal records. Because this paper’s focus is interrather than intra- municipal decision-making, the following assumption will be used:
mayors will veto anything other than the policy proposed in their campaign, and less
than 2/3rds of council will be opposed to this policy.44
National level politics are even more complex, and thus diverge even more from this
simple model. The candidates in this case would be political parties, which commit
to party platforms. Issues with single-member constituencies and multiple houses in
the legislature, with diﬀerent malapportionment in each house, are abstracted away
from. Election of representatives is also abstracted away from: individuals in areas
that are overrepresented are simply assumed to be able to cast more votes, and are
thus weighted more heavily.
Assumptions 3 and 4 are not quite satisﬁed in the data actually used: there
are a large but ﬁnite number of voters, and there are a few cases (generally in the
smallest municipalities), where there are locations θ and θ′ such that all voters are
indiﬀerent between randomization between the policies, versus a convex combination.
The argument regarding Assumption 3 is simply that thousands of voters is “close
enough” to a continuum. Regarding Assumption 4, violations of this assumption
still result in candidates proposing policies that maximize social welfare, only these
policies are no longer necessarily unique. For example, with the utility function
in Equation 3 consider a municipality with exactly half of its population at one
point, and exactly half at another point. Then any θ∗ between these two points
is welfare maximizing, and there is not a unique political equilibrium. Empirically,
actual population distributions are never this evenly balanced, and a unique θ∗ can
always be computed. Distance enters the utility function in Equation 3 linearly, and
44

Prior to the merger period, mayors were responsible for delivering hundreds of “agency delegated
functions” from higher levels of government, making them bureaucrats as well as politicians, and
making it possible (at least in theory) for central ministries to ﬁre a mayor for not performing a
delegated function according to speciﬁcations. “Agency delegated functions” were abolished during
the merger period, and municipal policies are thus modeled as being determined by local residents
through a political process.
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thus these θ∗ are points that minimize the sum of distances, points sometimes referred
to as “generalized medians”.
A.1.1

Municipal Mergers

The general political rules for municipal mergers were the following:45
0. Mayors of municipalities can create “voluntary merger committees” and “study
committees” to gather information, but there are no regulations regarding these committees, and they are not necessary in order to proceed with a merger.
1. A petition for a speciﬁed merger from 2% of eligible voters (or the municipal
council) in any single municipality forces an oﬃcial response from all the municipalities included in the proposed merger, based on a debate in their municipal councils.
Unanimous “yes” responses result in the creation of an “oﬃcial merger committee”.
There is no requirement regarding previous voluntary committees or study committees.
2. If a municipal council rejects the proposed merger committee, a petition from
1/6th of eligible voters in the relevant municipality forces a referendum on the creation
of the merger committee. A majority vote in the referendum overrides the council’s
rejection.
3. The merger committee produces reports on the ﬁnancial situation of the municipalities and proposes some characteristics of the merger (eg. the name of the merged
municipality). A majority vote in each municipal council is required to ﬁnalize the
merger.46
The existence of an oﬃcial referendum process during the planning stage but not
at the ﬁnal approval stage suggests that the best strategy for politicians opposed to
a merger might have been to remain silent during the initial stage, but then prevent
the ﬁnal resolution from passing in council. Behaviour such as this did in fact occur
in a small number of municipalities, but does not appear to have been particularly
common or successful. First, the process of creating the merger committee generally
attracted a considerable amount of attention, particularly in smaller municipalities.
In cases where there was controversy, referendum turnout rates could exceed 90%. It
45

This discussion ignores many details, such as the distinction between hennyuu municipalities,
where bylaws are inherited from one of the merger participants (normally the largest city), and
shinsetsu mergers, where bylaws and regulations are developed from scratch.
46
In general, the division of a municipality was prohibited. In one case, such a split did occur,
but both of the resulting municipalities were immediately merged with diﬀerent neighbours.
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was thus diﬃcult for politicians facing a potentially controversial merger to prevent a
referendum regarding the creation of the merger committee, and conditional on that
referendum passing it was diﬃcult to then vote against the ﬁnal proposed merger.
Furthermore, in cases where politicians did vote against mergers that appeared to
have popular support, a hitherto seldom used recall process was employed to remove
them from oﬃce via a majority vote in a recall referendum. Whereas there was only
one recall referendum during the 1990s, there were at least 41 during the merger
period.
A formal interpretation of these rules is somewhat diﬃcult; however, a common
element in all mergers is that they were approved by all municipalities in question,
either via local referendum, or in the municipal council.47 As council resolutions were
subject to veto by the mayor, this paper will assume that the binding constraint on
the behaviour of a municipality is the ability of its residents to recall the mayor.
Suppose that there is perfect information regarding what mergers are feasible (i.e.
will be approved by all other participants). The mayor proposes a merger for the
municipality to participate in, or proposes remaining independent. A single challenger
then appears, and similarly proposes a policy. With the probabilistic voting model
presented above, the challenger will run on the same platform as the mayor, and the
selected merger will maximize the sum of the utilities of residents.48
A potential objection here is that the costs of organizing a recall election could
be large, and thus the mayor’s incumbency advantage signiﬁcant enough to allow
merger proposals far from the optimal to be enacted.49 There are two responses to
47
In about a third of cases, referenda were held. Most of these were nominally consultative, but
there is only one instance in which a municipal council voted opposite to a referendum result. This
case was complicated due to multiple referenda with conﬂicting results as well as a number of of
other procedural irregularities, and ﬁnally resulted in a recall of the mayor and a request to the
prefectural governor to reverse the merger. The request for reversal was denied.
48
The assumption here that mayors do not have a large eﬀect on mergers might still seem suspicious. Kawaura [2010] investigates the eﬀect of a mayor’s length of tenure on merger conﬁgurations,
and ﬁnds eﬀects that are small and not statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level. While there is
certainly anecdotal evidence that certain mayors may have obstructed certain mergers, there is no
immediately obvious relationship in the aggregate data. The private incentive for municipal politicians to maintain the independence of their municipality in order to preserve their own employment
is not as strong as might be anticipated. This is due to central government policies: for example,
the length of service required to receive a pension were reduced for politicians in a municipality
participating in a merger, and following the merger period the pension system was abolished, with
a (disadvantageous) one-time payment to those who did not meet the standard 12 year length of
service requirement.
49
A recall referendum required a petition by between 1/6th and 1/3rd of residents.
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this objection: ﬁrst, the merger period was suﬃciently long that at least one regularly
scheduled election occurred during the merger period, and during this election the
merger issue was particularly salient; second, the cost of organizing a recall does not
appear to be as large as might be supposed. Speciﬁcally, in 4 of the 41 recalls, a
majority voted against the recall in the referendum, and in another 6 of the recalls,
the mayor was re-elected in the special election following the recall process (usually
after resigning voluntarily to avoid the recall referendum). Thus, a full quarter of
the organized recall referenda did not succeed in removing the mayor. If the costs
of organizing a recall referendum were very high, one would expect that they would
be organized only when the mayor would not have majority support in the recall
referendum or the subsequent election. Thus, this paper will use the assumption that
the municipal merger selected by each municipality maximized the utility of local
residents, given the possible alternative mergers.50

B Stability Concept
Suppose that player m ∈ M has preferences ⪯m deﬁned over the set {S ⊂ M |m ∈ S},
with ≺m indicating a strict preference. Extend these preferences to partitions in the
following way: if π(m) is the coalition that municipality m belongs to in partition π,
then π ⪯m π ′ if π(m) ⪯m π ′ (m). Let π ≺S π ′ for some coalition S if ∀m ∈ S, π ≺m π ′ .
The solution set is deﬁned using the von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] “stable
set”. Although the VNM stable set was originally deﬁned in terms of imputations
rather than coalition structures, this paper follows Lars [2007] in deﬁning the stable
set over coalition structures. Speciﬁcally, the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution
requires that (i) no coalition structure in the stable set be dominated by another
coalition structure in the set, and that (ii) any coalition structure outside of the set
is dominated by a coalition structure belonging to the set.
Deﬁnition 1 (Lars 2007). Let < be a dominance operator, and ΠVNM ⊆ Π. Then
ΠVNM is called a stable set for (Π, <) if the following two properties hold:
1. ∀π, π ′ ∈ ΠVNM , π ̸< π ′ . (Internal stability)
2. ∀π ∈
/ ΠVNM , ∃π ′ ∈ ΠVNM where π < π ′ . (External stability)
50

The speciﬁc deﬁnition of “alternative” that used here is that they would be deviations as discussed in Appendix B, below.
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Ray and Vohra [1997] only allow deviating coalitions to force reﬁnements of a
partition, and Diamantoudi and Xue [2007] show that this creates a stable set.51
The hedonic game considered in this paper is simpler than the “equilibrium coalition
structures” that Ray and Vohra examine, and thus in this paper both reﬁnements and
coarsenings will be allowed. Otherwise, the theory follows that presented in Ray and
Vohra. Let π ↗S π ′ and π ↘S π ′ mean that π ≺S π ′ , S ∈ π ′ , where π ′ is a coarsening
and a reﬁnement of π, respectively. Using the terminology of Ray and Vohra, π is
blocked by π ′ if either there is a set of coalitions in π that are unanimously in favour of
merging to create π ′ , or there is a subset of “perpetrators” in π that are unanimously
in favour of deviating from their current coalition. In the former case, π ′ is the
coarsening that results from the merger, while in the latter it is a reﬁnement that
includes a coalition for these perpetrators and some arrangement of the “residual” left
behind when the perpetrators deviated, such that the conﬁguration of perpetrators
and residual is stable. More formally, where → should be read as “blocked by”:
Deﬁnition 2. π → π ′ if ∃S such that either π ↗S π ′ or π ↘S π ′ , where
1. π ↗S π ′ if π ′ \ π = S such that π ≺S π ′ , and
a) S =

∪

Q for some Q ⊂ π, and

b) ∄S ′ ⊂ S such that π ′ ↘S ′ π ′′ .
2. π ↘S π ′ if ∃S ∈ π ′ such that π ≺S π ′ , and
a) π \ π ′ = S ′ with S ′ =

∪

Q′ for some Q′ ⊂ π ′ , and

b) ∄Q̃ such that Q′ → Q̃.
The recursion is well deﬁned since Q′ is a proper subset of π ′ . Now let ↠ be the
transitive closure of →.52 Assume that Π ̸= ∅.
Proposition 1. Π∗ = {π|∄π ′ such that π → π ′ } is a stable set with respect to (Π, ↠).
51

An alternative approach would be to allow only single player deviations, as in Greenberg [1979].
Ray and Vohra [1997] is used instead because anecdotal evidence suggests that multi-player deviations involving a reﬁnement or a coarsening were more common than single player deviations not to
a reﬁnement or a coarsening during the coalition formation process.
52
That is, π ↠ π ′ if either π → π ′ or ∃{π1 , . . . , πn } where π → π1 → . . . → πn → π ′ . To see why
the transitive closure is used here, consider the case where π1 ↘S π2 ↗S ′ π3 . π1 and π2 should not
be in the stable set, while π3 should, but {π3 } is not a VNM stable set with respect to → because
π1 ↛ π3 .

43

Proof. By construction, Π∗ is internally stable. Now take some π ∈
/ Π∗ . Then
∃{π1 , . . . , πn } ⊂ Π such that π → π1 → · · · → πn and either πn ∈ Π∗ or there is
a cycle with πn = πl for some l < n. If there is such a cycle, then it must contain
both mergers and dissolutions. However, such a cycle cannot exist because ↗ is
deﬁned such that there are no reﬁnements.
The proof of Theorem 1 in the main text is then very straightforward:
(existence). Immediate by the above deﬁnition of Π∗ .
(non-emptiness). If Π \ Π∗ = ∅ then Π∗ is not empty because Π is assumed not to be
empty. If Π \ Π∗ ̸= ∅ then Π∗ is not empty because external stability was shown in
the proof of Proposition 1.
(uniqueness). Suppose that Π∗∗ is also a stable set with respect to (Π, ↠). Consider
the bipartite directed graph deﬁned by ↠ with Π∗∗ \ Π∗ and Π∗ \ Π∗∗ as the two sets
of nodes. Every node must have in-degree of at least one, but there can be no cycles.
The only such graph is empty, and thus Π∗∗ = Π∗ .53
It can also be shown that Π∗ contains a Pareto optimal partition:
(PO element). Let ΠPO ⊂ Π be the set of Pareto optimal partitions, and ⇝ the
Pareto dominance operator. Suppose that ΠPO ∩ Π∗ = ∅ and consider the directed
graph deﬁned by ↠ ∪ ⇝ with ΠPO and Π∗ as two sets of nodes. A cycle must
exist, because ∀π ∈ ΠPO , ∃π ′ ∈ Π∗ such that π ↠ π ′ , but at the same time ∀π ∈
Π∗ , ∃π ′ ∈ ΠPO such that π ⇝ π ′ . Choose the starting point in this cycle such that
π0 ⇝ π1 ↠ · · · ↠ πn = π0 . Let S1+ be the set of agents that strictly prefer π1 to π0 . It
cannot be that π1 ↗ π2 because this is also a pareto improvement. Thus π1 ↘S ′ π2 ,
and S2+ = (S1+ \ R) ∪ P where R is some subset of the residual, and P ̸= ∅ is some
subset of the perpetrators, and (R ∪ P ) ⊂ S ′ . Since Sn+ = ∅, at some point the agents
in S2+ must be made worse oﬀ. This can only happen via reﬁnements, and only if
there is a residual smaller than S2+ . The latter, though, implies that either some
subset of S2+ cannot be made worse oﬀ, or that S3+ will contain some new element.
Thus, S + can never be empty. Thus a cycle cannot exist, and there is some Pareto
optimal element in Π∗ .
53

To see this, attempt to iteratively construct a non-empty graph that has the desired form.
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All partitions in Π∗ , including those that are not Pareto optimal, are treated
equally, since imposing additional restrictions at this stage would mean that the solution set would no longer be the outcome of the cooperative game coalition formation
process described above.54

C

Data and Institutional Details

Population data comes from the 1995 Japanese national census, which provides data
at the kilometer grid square level. Information on municipal boundaries is taken from
shape ﬁles produced by ESRI Japan, also for 1995. By combining these two data
sources, the location of individuals in municipalities can be known to the kilometer
grid square level.
To calculate distances, ﬁrst, the population of grid squares that are on a boundary
between two municipalities is divided between the municipalities in proportion to the
area of each grid square in each municipality. Then, for any θm , the distance ℓ(i, θm )
can be calculated as the great-circle distance from the physical longitude-latitude
location of individual i to θm . For computational simplicity, all individuals within a
given census grid square are assumed to live at the centre of the square. The distances
in question are small relative to the curvature of the earth, so this is eﬀectively a
straight-line distance calculation.
∗
The location θm
chosen by a municipality will minimize the sum of these individual distances, due to the assumption that the local political process is as described
∗
in Appendix A. These θm
are calculated via standard optimization techniques. Al∗
though, as discussed in Appendix A, there are cases where θm
might not be unique,
a unique value is in fact obtained for all municipalities. For each coalition S, the
optimal location θS∗ is calculated via exactly the same process. The value of ℓm (θS∗ )
in Equation 5 can then be calculated by averaging over distances ℓ(i, θS∗ ) for all individuals in m. This process is computationally intensive, but ℓm (θS∗ ) depends neither
on ϵ nor on β, and thus the calculation of these distances only needs to be performed
once.
Data for municipal characteristics Xm comes from the Statistical Information
There may be some “solutions” that seem particularly unattractive: {π ∈ Π∗ |∃π ′ ∈ Π∗ , π ⇝ π ′ }.
While the theory above could likely be rewritten to shrink the stable set, eliminating these elements,
it would be computationally infeasible to use any of these new restrictions in the empirical section,
as they would require enumerating the entire stable set.
54

45

Institute, which aggregates a variety of government sources. Where 1995 data was
not available, the year closest to 1995 was used. Data regarding municipal mergers
comes from the Japan Geographic Data Center. Figure 6 shows the mergers that
occurred in Shizuoka Prefecture.
Municipal ﬁnancial information was obtained from the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs
and Communications. The unit costs c̄k and adjustment coeﬃcients H̃k were more
challenging to obtain, both due to the complexity of the formulae and the fact that
some of the data used in the calculations is not publicly available.55 Discussions
with Ministry oﬃcials conﬁrmed that formulae for H̃k are determined by the expert
opinion of Ministry oﬃcers, and are not created directly via a regression of municipal
characteristics on previous municipal spending, nor by applying a speciﬁc set of a
priori assumptions regarding eﬃciencies of scale.56
First, Ministry oﬃcials set c̄k by considering the cost of providing component
good k for a reference municipality: a city with population of 100,000, surface area
of 160km2 , and other standard characteristics. The number and type of local bureaucrats necessary to provide the service is then estimated, along with the cost
of equipment and materials, plus any transfers to the relevant target population (eg.
child beneﬁt payments). The number and type of bureaucrats that smaller and larger
municipalities would require to provide the same level of service is then estimated.57
National Personnel Authority salary scales are then used to convert employee numbers to a total wage bill, which is added to an adjusted estimate for equipment and
materials. By deﬁnition there are no economies of scale with respect to transfers to
individuals, since the same level of service would imply the same level of transfers in
the cases where there are transfer payments.
The oﬃcial government formula for the calculation of c̃(Xm ) is
c̃(Xm ) =

24
∑

e
e k (Xm )).
Xmk · c̄k (1 + H

(39)

k=1
55

The 2009 version of the exposition of these formulae (the Chihō Kōfuzei Seido Kaisetsu), consists
of 600 pages of Japanese legal text, 460 pages of formulae, and 240 pages of reference values.
56
According to MIC oﬃcials, each year estimates are modiﬁed based on formal and informal
feedback from municipalities and prefectures, observed spending patterns, and in-house research.
57
The sizes at which these estimates are performed varies slightly from year to year and from
service to service, but in recent years estimates have generally been produced for populations of
4,000, 8,000, 12,000, 20,000, and 30,000 for municipalities below the reference size, and at 250,000,
400,000, 1,000,000, and 2,000,000 for municipalities above the reference size.
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e
e k takes the form
However, one pattern frequently observed is that H
∏ j
e
e k (Xm ) =
e (Xmj ) +
H
H
k
j∈J1

1
Xmk c̄k

∑

e j (Xmj ).
H
k

(40)

j∈J2

The total number of available “adjustment coeﬃcients” available in J1 ∪ J2 is 15, but
all 15 are never used for the same component good k.58 One interesting feature here
is that the “adjustments” based on characteristics in J2 do not actually depend on the
unit cost that they are supposedly adjusting, due to the division by Xmk c̄k .59 Thus,
de facto, the method for calculating c̃(Xm ) is
c̃(Xm ) =

24
∑

Xmk · c̄k (1 + H̃k (Xm )) + ζm ,

(41)

k=1

where
H̃k (Xm ) =

∏

H̃kj (Xm ),

(42)

j∈J1

which is Equation 18.60 Of the adjustment coeﬃcients in J1 , by far the most important
is the dankai (literally “step” or “grade”) adjustment, which is based on the scale of
the service provision. The dankai adjustment is generally based on the total number
of residents, but in some cases the relevant subgroup may be considered instead: the
adjustment for services to the elderly is based on the number of residents over 65,
the adjustment for agricultural services is based on the number of farmers, and so
forth.61 This adjustment is substantial, with the per capita cost of providing services
usually estimated to be 2 to 3 times higher for a municipality of 4000 people than
one of 100000. Dankai adjustments for some important services are shown in Figure
4. There are also other adjustments, such as one for population density: for example,
58
The precise number of adjustment coeﬃcients and component goods varies slightly from year to
year.
59
Expenses in this second group include those related to diﬀerent sorts of land (forest, farmland,
etc.), and costs related to American military bases. More problematically, they also include subsidies
related to construction bonds issued earlier in the 1990s. The values of ζ used in this paper attempt
to ignore the subsidies on these old outstanding bonds, but as exact data on bond payment schedules
is not available it is diﬃcult to do this perfectly.
60
Xm is more than a 24-tuple, with some elements used only in the calculation of the adjustment
coeﬃcients H̃(X).
61
The unit cost in these cases would be the estimated cost of providing elderly care for one person
over 65, agricultural services for one farmer, and so forth.

47

the estimate for the cost of providing ﬁreﬁghting is increased from ¥1.009 million to
¥1.029 million if the population density of a city with population 100,000 were 150
per km2 rather than 200. Population density also aﬀects the estimated cost of other
services such as elderly care and resident registration, but in diﬀerent ways, with the
eﬀect on ﬁreﬁghting costs in general being greater than the eﬀect on other component
goods.62
Ministry calculations of c̄k and H̃k are subject to two types of outside interference.
First, the amount of transfers allocated needs to somehow match the budget agreed
upon with the Finance Ministry. This is accomplished by modifying capital spending estimates, with the result that oﬃcial municipal capital spending “needs” vary
radically from year to year; estimates of the non-capital spending required to provide
municipal services, on the other hand, change very little.63 This sort of variation is
captured in the model presented in Section 1 through a change in b, the cost of public
funds. A second sort of interference comes from politicians, as well as line ministries
such as the Construction Ministry, and involves pressure to promote spending on
local projects. Over time, this has resulted in the addition of numerous “project” adjustment coeﬃcients, each providing a special incentive for a variety of public works
project. DeWit [2002] describes the history of this interference, which makes it clear
that government estimates of capital spending requirements are not closely related
to actual costs. This conclusion is supported by actual capital spending patterns,
which are not at all close to government estimates. This sort of variation is captured
in the model presented in Section 1 through a β4 that is less than 1, indicating that
the government is exaggerating expenses. The idea that a local government might
be forced by the national government to spend money on public services that it does
not want is captured through a tax ﬂoor at τ̄ , one of the speciﬁcations estimated in
Section 3.
The tax base Ym is determined from “Standard Fiscal Revenue” ﬁgures produced
by the Ministry. While the model in Section 1 has each municipality choosing a single
62

It was not possible to obtain data regarding some of the smaller adjustment coeﬃcients. For the
analysis conducted in this paper this portion of the costs are included in ζm . Thus, the data used in
this paper actually slightly understates the Ministry’s estimates of eﬃciencies of scale, making the
ﬁnding that β4 < 1 more surprising.
63
Occasionally modiﬁcations are also made by adding additional expense categories. These are
distinguishable from the usual expense categories by their placement at the end the list of expenses,
their short lifespan, and their non-speciﬁc names. The usual expense categories have remained
eﬀectively unchanged since at least 1968.
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tax rate τm , actual municipal tax revenues come from several taxes, with “ﬁxed asset”
taxes (land, housing, and some business assets) and personal income tax being the two
most important types. For each type of tax, the Ministry sets a “reference” tax rate,
and then calculates the total revenue each municipality would receive if it charged
these reference rates on its tax base. That is, if τ̄ k is the reference rate for tax type
k, and Ymk the tax base for this tax for municipality m, the Ministry “Standard Fiscal
∑
Revenue” estimate for municipality m is k τ̄ k Ymk . To convert this to the single tax
base that is assumed in this paper, suppose that the single tax base is income, and
set τ̄ = .12, which is total municipal Standard Fiscal Revenue as a fraction of total
income. Then calculate Ym for each municipality so as to satisfy
τ̄ Ym =

∑

τ̄ k Ymk .

(43)

k

That is, Ym is calculated so that τ̄ Ym is exactly equal to the Standard Fiscal Revenue
for that municipality, as reported by the Ministry. The tax rate actually observed in
∗
the municipality, τm
, is deﬁned as taxes as a fraction of Ym .
In general, collapsing multiple tax bases into a single tax base would be problematic, but in the Japanese case, although municipalities are de jure allowed to choose a
tax rate diﬀerent from the standard rate, the amount of actual variation is very low.
For example, in the extreme case of Yuubari City, eﬀectively bankrupt with a debt
of over ¥3 million per capita, the income tax rate was raised from 6.0% to 6.5%, but
almost all other municipalities charge the standard 6.0%. The standard ﬁxed asset
rate of 1.4% is levied by about nine out of ten municipalities, with the remaining
tenth mostly charging 1.5% or 1.6%.64 Thus, the observed tax data that the model
is attempting to explain involves all municipalities charging very similar tax rates,
equal or very close to the Ministry’s reference rate τ̄ . In particular, there are no cases
where a municipality chose to charge a very high rate on a particular tax base for
which the reference rate was much lower, a situation which could lead to high and
∗
.
nonsensical calculated values for τm
64

A ﬁxed asset rate of more than 1.7% requires Ministry approval, but few municipalities are at
this cap. While there are Ministry caps on taxes, these are rarely binding. The sole exception is
for taxes on corporations, where a sizeable number of municipalities do charge at the upper bound.
These corporate taxes are a small percentage of total taxes, and thus issues with this upper bound
are not considered in this paper.
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D
D.1

Computational Details
First type of moment inequality

Choose the form of h in Equation 28 to be
h(ω̄M , sM |X) =

∑

∑ Nm − 1
N N ′
√ m m (ω̄m − ω̄m′ )2 +
(s2m − 1)2 (44)
2
Nm + Nm′
m∈M
m,m′ adjacent

where the ﬁrst summation is over pairs of municipalities that are geographically adjacent.65 The calculation of h∗ in Equation 28 is not computationally feasible because
of the very large number of potential deviations that need to be considered. However,
as h∗ is only used in the inequality in (29), a lower bound h∗∗ can be used instead of
calculating h∗ directly.
Speciﬁcally, for an observed partition π, consider the following two types of deviations:
S c (π) = {S ′ |S ′ is a merger of two geographically adjacent singletons in π}
S r (π) = {S ′ |S ′ ⊂ S ∈ π}
Here S c (π) are coarsenings of the partition π, and S r (π) are reﬁnements. To retain
computational feasibility, restrict S r to contain only coalitions that are geographically contiguous and do not cross more than two county boundaries.66 Here, counties
are deﬁned using county deﬁnitions from the Meiji era.67 For some larger observed
65

This choice of h assigns very little weight to the sample means ω̄. The other moment inequalities
will eliminate values of β̂ where the model predicts many mergers that did not in fact occur. Thus,
this moment inequality is used mainly to eliminate values of β̂ that suggest that mergers that
actually occurred should not have. As the ω̄ terms can only make sample variances higher, and thus
in general will make mergers less attractive, the emphasis here is placed on the second term, the
sample variances s2 .
66
For the purposes of determining geographic adjacency, islands with only a single municipality
on them are treated as being connected to the closest municipality on the “mainland” (i.e. Hokkaidō,
Honshū, Shikoku, or Kyūshū) if it is within 50km. Using this deﬁnition almost all observed mergers
are geographically contiguous. More speciﬁcally, not counting island municipalities there are thirteen observed mergers that are not geographically contiguous. This is usually because one of the
participants dropped out late in the merger process.
67
In particular, the county boundaries used are from 1878 for eastern Japan, and 1896 for western
Japan. Counties are statistical divisions, and have not had any political function since the 1920s.
Counties in Tokyo and Nagano Prefectures are anomalously large, and thus in those prefectures
only the restriction is to one and two counties, respectively, rather than three. Two actual mergers
violate the restriction on number of counties that is imposed: one size twelve merger in Shizuoka,
and one size eleven merger in Niigata. This represents 0.3% of all observed mergers.
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coalitions S, the number of such subsets is still very large. In cases where there are
more than 1000 potential subsets S ′ ⊂ S for a given S ∈ π, use only the following:
1. S ′ is a singleton.
2. S \ S ′ is a singleton (i.e. subsets that involve leaving out only one municipality).
3. A random sample of other subsets such that the number of subsets examined
totals 1000.
The following are necessary conditions for π to be in the stable set Π∗ (ϵ(ω̄M , sM )|X, β):
∀S ′ ∈ S c (π) either vmm (β) + ϵm (ω̄M , sM ) > vmS ′ (β) + ϵS ′ (ω̄M , sM )

(45)

or vm′ m′ (β) + ϵm′ (ω̄M , sM ) > vm′ S ′ (β) + ϵS ′ (ω̄M , sM )
where S ′ = {m, m′ } is the potential merger of two singletons, and
∀S ′ ∈ S r (π) ∃m ∈ S ′ s.t. vmS (β) + ϵS (ω̄M , sM ) > vmS ′ (β) + ϵS ′ (ω̄M , sM )

(46)

where S is the coalition that m is a member of in π. As S ′ ⊂ S, this condition can
be expressed in a computationally simpler form:
∀S ′ ∈ S r (π) max(vmS (β) − vmS ′ (β)) > ϵS ′ (ω̄M , sM ) − ϵS (ω̄M , sM )
m∈S

(47)

Here S c considers only singletons in π, and S r considers only the non-singletons
in π. Equations 26 and 27 show that the calculation of ϵ for the coalitions involved in
these two sets of potential deviations depends on the ω̄ and s of disjoint sets of municipalities. This is because checking the necessary conditions for the coarsenings requires
examining only those municipalities that remained as singletons, while checking the
necessary conditions for reﬁnements requires checking only those municipalities that
participated in mergers. Furthermore, within the latter set, each actually observed
merger can be checked separately. That is,
h∗∗ (π|β, X)

=
+

∑

min h(ω̄M , sM |X) s.t. (45) is satisﬁed
min h(ω̄M , sM |X) s.t. (46) is satisﬁed for S

S

where conditions (45) and (46) depend on π, β, and X.
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(48)

Next, note that for a given β̂, the problem of calculating h∗∗ can be represented
as a minimization problem where the variables are (ω̄m − ω̄m′ )2 for adjacent m and
m′ , and s2m for all m. The constraints in Equations 45 and 46 are linear in these
variables, and the objective function h is a quadratic of them. Thus, the problem of
computing h∗∗ can be expressed as a quadratic program, or as a sum of the solutions
to several quadratic programs as shown in Equation 48. This latter form is computationally feasible, and can be solved quickly using commercially available quadratic
programming libraries such as CPLEX.

D.2

Second type of moment inequality

To see how Equation 32 can be used to create a moment inequality, ﬁrst let FQ (β)
be the distribution of the number of municipalities that would have participated in
mergers during the 1999-2010 period if the government had not implemented any
new merger promotion policies. By assumption (and after making an appropriate
adjustment for the fact that the 1979-1998 period is longer than the 1999-2010 period) FQ (β) is stochastically dominated by FQ79 (β), the distribution of the number
of municipalities that participated in mergers during the 1979-1999 period. FQ is
diﬃcult to calculate directly: not only is the true equilibrium selection rule unknown
but, as discussed at the beginning of Section 3.1, the precise membership of S is
both unknown and likely very large. Thus, instead consider a bound µ∗Q , such that
∗
0
EQ g2 (Q79 , β 0 |X) = µ79
Q − µQ (β |X)

(49)

≥ µ79
Q − µQ
which is greater than zero because the expected number of mergers under no policy
change has been assumed to not be greater that then number of mergers that occurred
before the merger period.
This bound µ∗Q can be computed by examining only size two mergers. Speciﬁcally,
if S = {m, m′ }, and umS > umm , um′ S > um′ m′ , then any stable partition must have
at least one of m and m′ participating in a merger, because S is a blocking coalition
for all other partitions. Let Sa be the set of size 2 mergers where the municipalities
are geographically adjacent, and both municipalities prefer the merger to remaining
as a singleton. This set can then be used to construct an easily computable minimal
number of municipalities that must be involved in mergers. Consider the following
52

variable, which is random because the membership of Sa depends on the draw of ω̄M
and sM :
Q∗ = argmin #Q s. t. ∀S ∈ Sa , S ∩ Q ̸= ∅
(50)
Q⊂M

That is, Q∗ is a minimal hitting set for Sa : for each potential geographically contiguous size 2 merger where both participants prefer the merger relative to not merging at
all, at least one of those municipalities is in Q∗ . For a given random draw of shocks,
Q∗ can be computed via a linear program. Let FQ∗ (β) be the distribution of #Q∗ . FQ
stochastically dominates FQ∗ , because Sa is a subset of all mergers whose participants
prefer the merger to remaining as a singleton, and thus any stable partition must
include at least #Q∗ municipalities participating in mergers regardless of equilibrium
selection rule. Examining potential pairwise mergers thus gives a lower bound on the
total number of municipalities participating in mergers of any kind.
The calculation of Q∗ involves a high dimensional integral because there are two
idiosyncratic shocks for each municipality, and many municipalities in a prefecture.
However, as only size 2 mergers between geographically adjacent municipalities are
considered, and very few of these mergers actually occur, the interactions between
municipalities that are far away are very weak. Thus, in a large prefecture such as
Hokkaidō, with 210 municipalities, simulation error in the southern portion of the
prefecture will have little eﬀect on mergers of northern municipalities, and thus the
law of large numbers will apply. In addition, there are multiple prefectures, and there
are assumed to be no interactions between them.

D.3

Identiﬁed Set and Conﬁdence Sets

The data consists of 47 prefectures, which are treated as independent coalition formation games. As in Table 1, prefectures are classiﬁed as “metropolitan”, “mixed”,
and “rural” depending on the percentage of municipalities with a population of less
than 10000. Let these sets of prefectures be J metro , J mixed , and J rural , respectively.
Let ḡ1metro (β) be the sample moment of g1 with prefectures J metro :
ḡ1metro (β) =

∑

1
#J metro

j∈J metro

53

g1 (πj0 , β|X)

(51)

where πj0 is the actually observed partition in prefecture j.68 Construct ḡ2 similarly:
for example, ḡ2mixed would be
ḡ2mixed (β) =

∑

1
#J mixed

g2 (Q79
j , β|X)

(52)

j∈J mixed

where Q79
j is the actually observed number of municipalities participating in mergers
in prefecture j during the 1979-1998 period. There are thus three sample moments
calculated from g1 (metro, mixed, and rural), and another three in the same way for
g2 . On the other hand, g3 is only calculated for “metro” (it will not bind for any
value of β for mixed or rural, due to the large number of mergers in these types of
prefectures):
∑
1
g3 (Q99
(53)
ḡ3metro (β) =
j , β|X)
#J metro
metro
j∈J

where Q99
j is the actually observed number of municipalities participating in mergers in prefecture j during the 1999-2010 period. These sample moments are then
combined into the test statistic
T(β) = [ḡ1metro (β)]2− + [ḡ1mixed (β)]2− + [ḡ1rural (β)]2− +
[ḡ2metro (β)]2− + [ḡ2mixed (β)]2− + [ḡ2rural (β)]2− +

(54)

[ḡ3metro (β)]2− + [ḡ4 (β)]2−
where [x]− = min(x, 0).69 Due to the distributional assumption already made regarding ω̄ and s, the ﬁrst six of the these terms are uncorrelated. ḡ3metro , however, could
well be correlated with ḡ1metro , as π 0 aﬀects both of these sample moments. Similarly, ḡ4 could plausibly be correlated with other moments. These correlations are
estimated using the subsample approach given in Andrews and Guggenberger [2009],
with critical values of T(β) computed accordingly. The identiﬁed set is the set of β̂
68

In the actual computations the weights on individual prefectures diﬀer to account for the diﬀering
number of municipalities in each prefecture.
69
Here g4 actually consists of two moment inequalities, because both an intercept and the size of
municipalities in question is used with γ in Equation 35, and both of these should have a coeﬃcient
of zero. Also, an adjustment is made to g2 and g3 to take into account that mergers are infrequent,
and thus are not well approximated by a normal distribution: quantiles of the actual distribution
of the lower bound on the number of mergers are estimated, and these are then used to perform a
normalization.
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such that
β̂ = argmin T(β).

(55)

β

Optimization is performed via Nelder-Mead, using the base implementation in R.
For the second and third types of moment inequalities, 1000 simulation draws are
used to calculate the moment. The optimization algorithm used ﬁnds only a local
minimum, and thus there is the possibility that this diﬀers from the global minimum.
The calculation of the conﬁdence set for each parameter, however, involves rerunning
the optimization routine with the relevant parameter ﬁxed at a certain value. On
average about 100 values were used: some of these values were very close to the
estimated parameter, while others were further away. These additional starting points
do not result in any lower objective function values than the one that I ﬁnd at the
reported optimum.
Following convention, the 95% conﬁdence set will be
{β|T(β) < T(β̂) + T0.95 (β̂)}

(56)

where T0.95 (β̂) is the 0.95 quantile of the distribution of the test statistic under the
hypothesis that β = β̂. Constructing a 95% conﬁdence set for β is simpliﬁed because
assumptions regarding the distribution and most of the correlation structure of the
error terms have already been necessary in order to develop the model.
The coverage probability of this conﬁdence set is checked via Monte Carlo. 100
simulations of the municipal merger process are performed using the estimated parameters as the true parameters. The 95% conﬁdence set has a coverage probability
of 1.00, and an 80% conﬁdence set has a coverage probability of 0.98.70

D.4

Example with two municipalities per prefecture

The moment inequality based on g1 has not previously appeared in the literature.
A simple example illustrates the identiﬁed set produced: notably, it will not exclude
β = 0.
Let J be a set of prefectures each containing only two municipalities, Aj and Bj ,
with a potential merger Sj = {Aj , Bj }. For simplicity, let there be only a single
70

In these simulations, an average of 67 municipalities participated in mergers under the original
government transfer policies. This corresponds to about 2% of the 3255 original municipalities.
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idiosyncratic shock ϵj in each prefecture:
uAj Aj = uBj Bj = β

(57)

uAj Sj = uBj Sj = 2β + ϵj

(58)

and make the distributional assumption ϵj ∼ N (0, 1). Here, setting the variance to
one normalizes the scale for β. Let π 0 be the observed partition: the only options for
prefecture j are the singletons {Aj } and {Bj }, or the merger {Aj , Bj }. Deﬁne the
following stability restriction:
R(ϵ, π|β) :

∀j ∈ J, ϵj ≤ −β if {Aj }, {Bj } ∈ π
ϵj ≥ −β if {Aj , Bj } ∈ π

Now choose h(ϵ) =

∑

2
j∈J ϵj .

(59)
(60)

Thus, E(h) = J. Then deﬁne

ϵ∗ (β) = argmin h(ϵ)
ϵ

s.t. R(ϵ, π 0 |β).

(61)

That is, ϵ∗ (β) is the vector of idiosyncratic shocks that generate the least extreme
value from h while still rationalizing π 0 . Let that value of h be
h∗ (β) = min h(ϵ)
ϵ

s.t. R(ϵ, π 0 |β).

(62)

Let ϵ0 be the actual epsilons that were drawn and resulted in π 0 being observed. Let
β 0 be the true value of β. Then
h∗ (β 0 ) ≤ h(ϵ0 )

(63)

because ϵ0 being drawn resulted in partition π 0 occurring, and thus R(ϵ0 , π 0 |β 0 ) must
be satisﬁed. If the inequality is always satisﬁed, it is satisﬁed in expectation:
E(h(ϵ)) − E(h∗ (β 0 )) ≥ 0,

(64)

where E(h∗ (β 0 )) indicates the expected value of h∗ for a partition generated from
a random draw of ϵ. In this particular example, for any draw of ϵ there will only
be one stable partition, but neither this uniqueness nor any particular assumptions
regarding an equilibrium selection rule is required for the above inequalities to hold.
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The expected fraction of prefectures with a merger is Φ(β 0 ). The expected value
of h∗ (β) is
Φ(β 0 ) min(0, β)2 + (1 − Φ(β 0 )) max(0, β)2
(65)
Using only the above moment inequality for identiﬁcation, we will have the identiﬁed set
{β

|

1 − Φ(β 0 ) min(0, β)2 + (1 − Φ(β 0 )) max(0, β)2 ≥ 0}

which corresponds to the interval [ √ −1 0 , √
Φ(β )

1
].
1−Φ(β 0 )

(66)

This interval contains zero,

which is a general property of this type of moment: the “entirely idiosyncratic” null
hypothesis will never be rejected. In order to reject β̂ = 0, some additional moments
of some other type must be used. In the estimator in the main paper, these correspond
to the moments comparing the expected number of mergers if the government had
not changed any transfer policies to the actual number of mergers observed during the
period in which the old transfer policies were in eﬀect. Considering the speciﬁcation
used in the main analysis, at β̂ = 0, there would have been a large number of “random”
mergers, and thus this null hypothesis is easy to reject using these other moments.71
71

The above estimator may appear to be somewhat similar to other estimation approaches, such
as maximizing the probability that the observed partition is stable. Estimators in this latter set,
however, are not in general consistent, and will thus not necessarily be inside the identiﬁed set
based on the moment inequality used above. To take an extreme example, suppose that there are
K municipalities in each prefecture, and that the only mergers that are possible are {m1 , m2 },
{m1 , m2 , m3 }, ... {m1 , m2 , ..., mK }. Preferences are determined by
#S √
+ Kϵj ,
K
K −1
=k−
2

umk S =
u mk mk

S ̸= {mk }

(67)
(68)

where #S is the number of municipalities in S, and j indexes prefectures. Thus there is again
only one idiosyncratic shock per prefecture, and only one stable partition: if ϵ = 0, for example,
municipalities up to K/2 will merge. The probability of any given merger being stable is thus small
if K is large. Now consider the more general model
#S
K + 10
+ K 1/3 ϵj ) + β(k −
+ ϵ2j ),
K
2
K −1
=k−
2

umk S = (1 − β)(
u mk mk

S ̸= {mk }

(69)
(70)

When β = 1, then, most of the time no mergers are stable, but when there is a very extreme ϵ then
all mergers are stable (indiﬀerent municipalities prevent deviations in the deﬁnition of stability used
in this paper). Now suppose that the true value of β is β 0 = 0, and consider a pseudo-likelihood
estimator that maximizes the probability that the observed partition is stable. Then for suﬃciently
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large K, β PMLE = 1, because all mergers are stable when any merger is stable, unlike the situation
at β 0 . The identiﬁed set using the technique outlined above, however, would exclude β̂ = 1, as
this would involve ϵ∗ that are very extreme, and the moment inequality would be violated. Thus,
the (inconsistent) maximizer of the pseudo-likelihood function based only on stability is not always
contained in the identiﬁed set.
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